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Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is a pervasive vulnerability that involves a huge portion of modern
web applications. Implementing a correct and complete XSS filter for user-generated content
can really be a challenge for web developers. Many aspects have to be taken into account since
the attackers may continuously show off a potentially unlimited armory.
This work proposes an approach and a tool – named snuck – for web application penetration
testing, which can definitely help in finding hard-to-spot and advanced XSS vulnerabilities.
This methodology is based on the inspection of the injection’s reflection context and relies on a
set of specialized and obfuscated attack vectors for bypassing filter based protections, adopted
against potentially harmful inputs. In addition, XSS testing is performed in-browser, this
means that a web browser is driven in reproducing the attacker and possibly the victim be-
havior.
Results of several tests on many popular Content Management Systems proved the benefits
of this approach: no other web vulnerability scanner would have been able to discover some
advanced ways to bypass robust XSS filters.
Keywords: computer security, network security, web application security, browser security,
vulnerability detection, cross-site scripting, XSS
snuck is an open-source software released under the Apache 2.0 license -
http://code.google.com/p/snuck/
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About this document
Preamble. This technical report derives from the Master’s Thesis “Automatic and Context-
Aware Cross-Site Scripting Filter Evasion” by Mauro Gentile, submitted in Octo-
ber 2012 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Engineering in
Computer Science at the School of Information Engineering, Computer Science, and
Statistics of Sapienza University of Rome under the supervision of the prof. Fabrizio
d’Amore.
Work’s goal. The goal of this work is to propose an approach for significantly testing an
XSS filter by reproducing the behavior of the attacker who insistently tries to break
it. In addition, since we want to reduce the false positive rate to zero, we propose a
new method to simulate the victim’s behavior with respect to the occurred injection.
We will illustrate these concepts in detail in the next chapters.
Paper organization. This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 1 gives a wide overview
about modern web application security scanners, trying to explain their limitations
and which are the methods we want to employ to test XSS filters. Chapter 2 explains
the basic concepts behind Cross-Site Scripting prevention and presents many common
attack scenarios. Chapter 3 describes the methodologies we adopted and the techniques
we employed for building up the tool snuck. Chapter 4 explains the tool’s architecture
by giving particular attention to the operations it performs against an XSS filter. In
Chapter 5 we present the performed experiments against popular Content Management
Systems, whereas in Chapter 6 we propose several future improvements.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Cross-Site Scripting is a web application vulnerability in which malicious scripts are injected
into a trusted web site by an attacker. This type of vulnerability has emerged as one of
the most serious threats on the Web1 since it revealed to affect a very large number of web
applications.
On the one side it is usually straightforward to exploit an XSS vulnerability, on the other
side it may be really a challenge to build a completely XSS-safe web site.2 Hence, several
research has been performed in order to detect or prevent unauthorized scripts from being
included in the server output. The impact of such vulnerabilities may really harm an authen-
ticated user since many techniques can be adopted to make a convincing exploit; stealing
session information is just the tip of the iceberg since much more sophisticated attacks may
take place once an injection point is detected, leading for instance to escalating privileges
with only one click from the victim’s perspective.
Cross-Site Scripting attacks are commonly underestimated by many web developers, who
naively assume that stopping payloads like <script>alert(1)</script> is the most suit-
able way to lay up an XSS-safe web site. Unfortunately modern web browsers offer a huge
set of possibilities for the attackers to execute malicious JavaScript. We will show many
examples in this work.
1CWE, 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors, http://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.
html (Sep 2011)
2OWASP, OWASP Appsec Tutorial Series - Episode 3: Cross Site Scripting (XSS), http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=_Z9RQSnf8-g (July 2011)
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1.2 XSS Classification and Threat Model
As any good work regarding XSS attacks, we distinguish three types: reflected, stored and
DOM Based XSS. These threats are briefly described in the next lines.
Reflected XSS. An XSS vulnerability is reflected if the injection is echoed by the server
in the immediate response to an HTTP request. It is usually required that the victim
clicks on a crafted link to make the attack start; in addition, a cross domain request
could be employed to trigger such kind of issues. These are also referred as first-order
XSS.
Stored XSS. The injection is stored in a permanent data store and it is echoed every time
a user visits the unsafe web site. Obviously the range of potential victims is greater
than in the reflected XSS, since the payload is displayed to any visitor. These are also
referred as second-order XSS.
DOM Based XSS. OWASP refers to this type of XSS as “an XSS attack wherein the
attack payload is executed as a result of modifying the DOM “environment” in the
victim’s browser”.3 In practice the attacker could misuse the existent client side script
in order to make it work maliciously. In fact, the categorization “reflected” and “stored”
XSS is not sufficient since attacks “that do not rely on sending the malicious data to
the server in the first place” may definitely happen in Web 2.0 [1] (where client side
scripting is gaining more and more attention [2]).
Besides the typical circumstances, XSS attacks can take place through advanced scenar-
ios, a common example is through Content Sniffing: web browsers tend to perform obscure
operations and somersaults to detect and handle various file types and encoding schemes.
This may lead to Cross-Site Scripting in the case for instance the browser renders as HTML
what meant to be an image.
Basically “a clever attacker could manipulate the browser into interpreting seemingly harm-
less images or text documents as HTML, Java, or Flash – thus gaining the ability to execute
malicious scripts in the security context of the application displaying these documents”,4
therefore serving uploaded documents properly becomes fundamental for preventing these
attacks. Good practices, such as returning an explicit and well-know Content-Type value and
a precise charset, are mandatory for realizing a robust application; nevertheless the safest
approach consists of adopting separate, isolated web origins such that uploaded files cannot
be a threat at all. Obviously this would lead to define robust policies for accessing files:
using the users’ cookies for the “sandbox” domain is mindless, while introducing random
3OWASP, DOM Based XSS, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/DOM_Based_XSS
4Zalewski, M., Content hosting for the modern web, http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.it/2012/
08/content-hosting-for-modern-web.html (Aug 2012)
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and temporary tokens in the URLs looks to be a winning approach.
For the sake of completeness, since Internet Explorer up to version 7 could in some cases
report a MIME type different than the type specified by the web server, a precise HTTP
response header was introduced in order to stop the so called MIME-sniffing, the X-Content-
Type-Options ; if setted to nosniff the content will not be sniffed, thus preventing for instance
to render a text/plain document as HTML. Nevertheless omitting this header may sometimes
lead IE to perform some obscure procedures in order to sniff the content: Hasegawa, a well
known security researcher, showed how it is possible to force IE to sniff the content in order
to trigger an XSS attack [3].
As you might guess, realizing a robust application able to serve users’ uploaded content is
not a trivial task at all, for further information refer to the excellent Zalewski’s book [Zal12].
Open Redirect [4] is another severe vulnerability, in which the attacker could make the victim
visit malicious web pages without realizing it. These attacks could take place from both the
client and the server side: JavaScript and in particular the location object is involved in the
client-side, while the HTTP response header Location comes into play at the server-side.
On the client-side, it is quite common to discover DOM Based XSS in which the attacker
may trigger an XSS through pseudo-schemes, such as javascript and data, while at the
server-side having access to a Location’s value might lead to redirect the victim to another
unexpected domain. Note that having access to an HTTP header’s response might lead to
another severe vulnerability, called HTTP response splitting,5 which is associated with many
exploitation scenarios, such as session fixation and, again, XSS. Basically web browsers offer
several approaches to execute a redirect, thus to initialize attacks and execute script code.
Browsers’ plugins, such as Flash, Java, PDF, have their own methods to produce a redirect,
the interested reader can refer to the HTML5 Security Cheatsheet, Redirection Methods.6
XSS attacks may be triggered through Clickjacking7 too, this technique allows attackers to
alter a web site’s visual display while preserving its functionality. In this case the attacker
may put a target web site into an invisible iframe and ask the victim to extract or inject con-
tent through drag and drop operations giving possibly place to a Self-XSS or cross-domain
content extraction.
Being able to inject malicious JavaScript into a trusted web site implies a really high
risk for the users: XSS can achieve very sophisticated results in the case the attacker uses
5OWASP, HTTP Response Splitting, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/HTTP_Response_Splitting
6HTML5 Security Cheatsheet, RedirectionMethods, http://code.google.com/p/html5security/wiki/
RedirectionMethods
7Kotowicz, K., Exploiting the unexploitable XSS with clickjacking, http://blog.kotowicz.net/2011/03/
exploiting-unexploitable-xss-with.html
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exploitation frameworks, such as BeEF8 or XSSF9. Basically, the hackers could fingerprint
the internal network via JavaScript in order to identify known connected devices and exploit
them whenever a vulnerability exists. Furthermore XSS tunneling proxy permits to browse
the hooked domain through the security context of the victim browser; this implies that
the authenticated surface can be scanned to detect new vulnerabilities, which could not be
accessible earlier.
Web application security is a fundamental component in the modern computing industry.
In the last years many flaws allowed hackers to illegally access sensitive data; consequently
huge costs are required to assess the impact of the attack, the application’s weaknesses and
especially the backwashes in terms of customers loss.
1.3 Scenario and terminology
Since the end user’s browser has no way to know whether a script comes from an injection,
it will have no reasons to not execute it; developers use to adopt several countermeasures
in order to avoid these kind of flaws, but realizing robust XSS filters may result in a very
difficult task since several aspects should be taken into account.
Web application vulnerabilities can be detected by making manual penetration testing and
this reveals to be successful in the case the tester can also examine the code. Unfortunately,
this is a very time consuming task and it might require expert skills. Web vulnerability
scanners, instead, allow penetration testers and developers to automatically analyze web
sites aiming at of detecting security issues in a relative small time window and in a fairly
good detection rate.
In this work we talk about several attack scenarios, in which basically the attacker injects
a web page (injection page) by making an HTTP request; we expect this injection being
reflected into the same page or into another page and we refer such a page as a reflection
page. In addition, we are interested in the context, that is the exact point within the injected
web page’s DOM in which the injection is reflected and we refer such a context as a reflection
context.
For instance the attacker could inject a web page A by submitting a form, while the payload
will be reflected in a web page B, that is actually related to the first one. The relation is
based on the web application’s intended workflow and it should be identified by the tester
once got a basic understanding of the way it works. At this point the attacker should need to
know which is the reflection context within the HTML code of B in order to identify whether
an attack is possible and especially which is the right payload to be employed in order to
trigger an XSS attack.
8BeEF, The Browser Exploitation Framework Project, http://beefproject.com/
9XSSF, Cross-Site Scripting Framework, http://code.google.com/p/xssf/
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1.3.1 Basic filter based XSS prevention techniques
In the last years several approaches for protecting against XSS have been proposed. The
complexity of such a task is obviously huge from the point of view of web developers, who
should be trained by security experts about this type of threat. The adopted protection
should also be exposed to a strong testing phase, performed by very experienced penetration
testers.
The “real-world” XSS protections are widely discussed in Chapter 2; essentially web appli-
cations stop users to provide malicious inputs by inspecting them in order to detect whether
an XSS injection attempt is occurring and this is the most common way of detecting and
stopping XSS. Different approaches are also possible: for instance Web Application Firewalls
are appliances that block common attacks by enforcing a set of rules to an HTTP conversa-
tion.
In this work XSS protection systems and sanitization functions that prevent malicious code
to be supplied are referred as filters ; in particular we consider that users can marshal content
through a web application and that this latter adopts its own prevention techniques to stop
harmful inputs or to modify them in an harmless form.
Input validation should be adopted when handling an input from a data entry point, while
contextual output encoding should used when reflecting it. Although this practice looks to
be easy, many applications validate inputs through poorly effective filters, that would allow
attackers to manage an attack.
After all, filtering the user-generated content has critical consequences in terms of security:
giving people the possibility to publish its own HTML is in many cases synonym of XSS.
In addition, testing a filter is extremely compelling: discovering a successful bypass could
require time and especially a very strong background in breaking web application protection
systems.
1.3.2 Web Application Security Scanners
Once defined the basic terminology and showed a simple scenario, we remind the way web
vulnerability scanners work. They can be divided into two wide categories: black-box and
white-box scanners.
The first approach practically works by looking for data entry points (DEPs) through a
crawler module – which are from the scanner’s perspective toys to play with – and by in-
jecting various patterns in order to identify security issues. Basically the most naive way
to do that consists of trying to understand whether the injected payload is reflected within
the reflection page without being somehow modified. Regular expressions and XPath queries
may be really useful to achieve such a result. A good example could be SecuBat by Kals et
al. [KKKJ06], whereas a wider discussion has been provided by Fong et al. [FO07].
By the way Petukhov et al. [PZ08] showed that this approach does not guarantee neither
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accuracy nor completeness of the obtained results: false positives are actually possible and a
poor coverage of DEPs may severely decrease the overall completeness of analysis. This prob-
lem becomes considerable in the case the tested application makes massive use of JavaScript
code, possibly causing the crawler to miss relevant pages to explore whenever links are gen-
erated at run-time through client-side code. Classical scanning mixed with logged requests
through a proxy10 could address this problem, but obviously it might be required to interact
with all the components constituting a web page to extract every “hidden” URL.
The second approach, white-box scanning, is based on web application analysis with the
assumption that source code is available and can be reviewed; it is surely the most complete
way to detect security vulnerabilities, but it requires experts and security minded people.
1.4 Motivation
Black-box web vulnerability scanners still struggle with the detection of XSS vulnerabili-
ties, especially the second order ones. Actually the inability to catch the web application’s
intended workflow reveals to be the main limitation of the current scanners, moreover com-
plex forms with aggressive input checking may block them, without giving any chance to go
deeper in the web site structure.
Bau et al. [BBGM10] and Doup et al. [DCV10] are excellent evaluations of web vulnerability
scanners. Both showed that almost all of them fail to properly detect second order XSS; in
practice scanners are not able to understand what is the relationship among different web
pages: an injection in a web page A may trigger an XSS in a completely different web page
B.
Modern web application, in particular social networks, owe their popularity to people who
publish their own contents; it is obvious that giving the users the possibility to share stuff,
which is permanently stored and accessible to many visitors, may lead to XSS in the case no
proper sanitization is performed. Hence, web developers might need to significantly test their
sanitization systems in order to assess whether bugs are actually present. Obviously, since
many steps could separate the injection page from the reflection page, the testing mechanism
should need to know how precisely reach this latter and which are the operations needed to
activate the XSS filter.
In other words, we need a tool which is able to break an XSS filter, given the path from the
injection page to the reflection one.
1.4.1 Workflow-based approach
The classical data-driven approach for scanning web applications for security issues requires
a crawler module, which is able to identify data entry points; basically it is straightforward
10Ivashchenko, T., Automation of modern web application security testing, http://www.oxdef.info/talk/
en/j4m2012/webapps/
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to infer that a poor crawling engine implies a very low detection rate [DCV10]. Hence,
Korscheck [Kor10] introduced a smart way to realize a penetration test, that is practically
based on the possibility to define a path to be tested, trying to overcome barriers in the
workflow. The workflow-based approach can absolutely leverage the XSS detection rate and
it seems to be a promising concept to solve the above mentioned limitations.
In this work we use this approach by giving the tester the possibility to define a sequence
of operations the tool should replicate, but we specialize the testing with respect to one
particular XSS filter; this means that we are not going to describe a tool which, given a
workflow, tries to just discover XSS vulnerabilites along this path, but an approach for
significantly testing XSS filters by giving the testers the chance to select a path within the
application, that connects the injection page to the reflection page. Detailed information and
concepts will be mentioned in the next chapters.
1.4.2 Context-aware paradigm
The way many scanners generate XSS injection patterns is often naive and consists of inject-
ing a complete set of strings, such as <script>alert(1)</script> and similars, without
considering the reflection context. For instance it does not make sense to inject an HTML
element such as <img src=xx:x onerror=alert(1) /> in the case the payload is reflected
within an attribute of an HTML element, which cannot be broken.11 This naive logic may
considerable decrease the detection rate for simple to detect XSS vulnerabilities too.
Skipfish12, web application security reconnaissance tool, and XSS Rays13, XSS reversing/s-
canner tool, solve this issue by injecting a complex string, a multi context XSS vector, that
works in multiple contexts and web browsers. However many different filtering techniques
against user-generated content are possible, thus several muti-context XSS vectors should
be injected in order to reliably assess whether a bug is present. For instance let us consider
a form accepting a syntactically correct URL with a parsing engine just blocking strings
containing script, img or svg; we might end up our test by reporting that no XSS is possible
because every vector we adopted contained at least one disallowed tag, whereas something
like javascript:alert(1) would have triggered an XSS.
Taking decisions during the test process would be an obvious way of proceeding in order to
identify which are the best payloads to be employed for a certain reflection context. This
approach can be easily achieved by first making a non-malicious injection, then by inspecting
the page for the reflection context and eventually by specializing the malicious vectors to be
supplied.
In fact generating attacks on the basis of the output in a feedback fashion was similarly used
11It means that quotes are escaped, therefore the attacker cannot break the attribute
12Zalewski, M., Skipfish, web application security scanner, http://code.google.com/p/skipfish/
13Heyes, G., XSS Rays extension, http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2011/01/21/xss-rays-extension/
(Jan 2011)
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by Ciampa et al. [CVDP10] in a heuristic-based approach for SQL-Injection vulnerabilities
[5, 6] detection. Obviously pattern matching of error messages cannot be applied for XSS
injections, but the idea of having a set of particular and targeted vectors is absolutely rea-
sonable for increasing the chances of catching vulnerabilities.
The aforementioned approach is currently adopted by many valid scanners, that’s the case
for instance of IronWasp [7], Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner14 and OWASP ZAP15,
whose XSS detection engines make targeted injection on the basis of the point in which the
injection falls.
1.4.3 In-browser scanner
Modern web browsers have somehow different capabilities and offer different ways to trigger
a Cross-Site Scripting attack. HTML5 Security Cheatsheet16 is an excellent resource for
identifying which vectors work on major web browsers. Actually a very good XSS scanner
would need to really search for XSS vulnerabilities within the web browser context, therefore
different browsers should be taken into account and different results may be generated on
this basis.
The most trivial example consists of a web page which accepts a parameter, whose content
is reflected within an attribute style of a DIV element; older versions17 of Internet Explorer
allow to trigger an XSS by employing the CSS extension expression().18,19 By running a
scanner within Firefox, it would report that no XSS is possible, while it would return positive
results in Internet Explorer.
Scanners and web browsers need to be somehow strictly related in order to achieve a complete
and reliable scan.
Obviously the same could be performed through basic scanners without web browser support,
however this classical approach would result in many false positives; realizing whether an
injection is successful can be done by catching alert dialog windows in the web browser. In
this work the concept of grabbing an alert window will be adopted in order to reduce the
false positive rate to zero. Obviously we make the assumption that no alert dialog windows
are already present in the reflection page: we do not rate it as a strong assumption since
modern web applications rarely disturb visitors through such alerts.
14Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner, http://www.acunetix.com/vulnerability-scanner/
15OWASP ZAP, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project
16HTML5 Security Cheatsheet, http://html5sec.org/
17Internet Explorer 7, Internet Explorer 8 and 9 in compatibility mode or if no doctype defined. Also Opera
allows to execute JS within the CSS context via the -o-link property - http://html5sec.org/#9
18MSDN, About Dynamic Properties, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms537634(v=vs.85)
.aspx
19Hasegawa, Y., Cause of XSS by excessive detection of “expression” in IE, http://openmya.hacker.jp/
hasegawa/security/expression.txt (Nov 2006)
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1.5 Objectives
The aim of this work is to present a security tool, which is able to identify and exploit very
difficult to spot cross-site scripting vulnerabilities within a web application, or more precisely
to automatically reproduce the behavior of an expert while trying to identify a bypass for
an XSS filter.
Since it is widely focused on second order cross-site scripting vulnerabilities, it uses a
workflow-based approach as introduced by Korscheck [Kor10] with the tool iSTAR; it differ-
entiates itself since it is able to automatically detect which is the reflection context and to
specialize the attack vectors on this basis. Moreover it allows the tester to reverse engineer
the XSS filter in order to understand what is allowed to be supplied; it gives him also the
possibility to add new malicious payload to be injected in a simple and modular way and it
is designed with attack vectors’ obfuscation in mind. Another key point, that distinguishes
our tool from other XSS scanners, is the fact that false positive rate is equal to zero because
each reported vulnerability is the result of a successful injection.
Let us imagine to have a social network where users can share information and their friends
can read it; this target web site performs some kind of input validation and it just allows to
share plain text posts or links under the form of HTML anchors, i.e. <a href="http://evil.
com">click me!</a>. The smart attacker would obviously think that links may be in-
volved to trigger an XSS attack, it would try to inject something like <a href="javascript:
alert(1)">click me!</a> and it would click the resulting link in order to check whether
an alert window is fired. From the web scanner’s perspective it may be useful to perform two
steps in the case an injection requires user interaction to be triggered, the first one consisting
of injecting a malicous anchor, while the second one consisting of reproducing the behavior
of a victim, who clicks that link. This is the basic idea we used for our tool in order to
reproducing both sides of a real attack; more information about this point will be explained
in the next chapters.
Classical web application scanners work quite differently with respect to our tool, since this
latter is able to discover XSS vulnerabilities within the reflection page only; it practically
requires the tester to have a basic understanding about the way the application works and
to be able to define a sequence of operations in which a data entry point is injected and
a reflection page is inspected for the presence of malicious scripts. In other words it can
be properly considered as an automatic XSS tester which can definitely help in discovering
hard-to-spot vulnerabilities, given a certain logic for the application.
In this work we present snuck, a cross-site scripting filters evasion tool, and we also describe
some experiments on a variety of web applications in order to show its behavior with respect
to robust XSS filters.
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Chapter 2
Defense and offense concepts
This chapter presents a brief survey on the common methods that web applications use to
protect themselves against XSS and explains basic, but very common, XSS attack scenarios.
2.1 Protecting against XSS
With the advent of Web 2.0, user-generated content gained increasingly attention and started
being the main content of modern web applications; on the one side applications need to
be simple, usable and flexible, on the other side they need to be as secure as possible. This
reveals to a be a kind of trade-off, the more the application is flexible and gives the users
multiple levels of freedom in terms of allowed inputs, the more likely the attacker is able to
discover a flaw to attack it.
Web applications use to prevent malicious users from injecting JavaScript or inserting mal-
formed HTML within web pages with different techniques. The most common way to protect
against XSS consists of adopting HTML filters, such as HTML Purifier,1 that inspect input
sources looking for XSS evidence and perform a sanitization process in order to clean any
potentially harmful input.
XSS can be mitigated on the client-side too, this is the case of NoScript,2 a Firefox extension
whose goal is to detect and block malicious script from being executed. Actually modern web
browsers started adopting built-in protections against reflected XSS by identifying attack ev-
idences in the URL and modifying the injected web page in order to avoid the execution of
the malicious code; Google Chrome and Internet Explorer are currently employing their own
filters.
Another approach consists of adopting Web Application Firewalls (WAFs), which are ap-
pliances that basically detects and stops malicious requests to reach the web application in
order to avoid security breaches. Since the underline application remains insecure, WAFs
1HTML Purifier, http://htmlpurifier.org/
2Maone, G., NoScript, http://noscript.net/
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can be seen like plasters: they do not completely solve the issues, but they just try to stop
them coming out.
A modern introduction for preventing XSS is the Content Security Policy (CSP): since new
vulnerabilities may be introduced along the time, a secure site today can become vulnerable
in the future. Content Security Policy3 is an experimental security extension whose goal is
to help mitigating and detecting types of attacks such as XSS and data injection by specify-
ing the domains that the browser should consider to be valid sources of executable scripts.
Thus inline scripts and event-handling HTML attributes are not executed by default in CSP
enabled sites.
The CSP policy directives are delivered via HTTP headers, so the receiver browser should
be able to understand which particular resource should be trusted and rendered.
For the sake of completeness, an interesting automatic tool aiming at retrieving CSP poli-
cies, called CSP AiDer [Jav11], has been introduced by Javed. In practice it works through
a crawler which scans web pages to grab information needed in the policies.
Despite the potential of this further security layer, very few sites are currently adopting it
and the qualitative effects of such an adoption may be not exciting as expected [8].
2.2 Attack scenarios
Since we need to understand how an attacker interacts with a target web application, we
present three different attack scenarios; our main goal is to find out which is the most
accurate and complete way an automated XSS filter “breaker” could work.
Scenario 1: Blog Comment I Let us consider a target application that allows users to
leave comments: the accepting form consists of three fields, the first one need to be
filled with the user’s name, the second one is optional and it would contain the visitor’s
website, whereas the third one contains the comment (Figure 2.1).
From the penetration tester’s perspective, it is useful to define a sequence of operations
such that the form is populated with correct inputs, it is submitted and the reflection
page is inspected for the presence of an XSS – i.e. by looking for the injection within
the web page containing the comments.
For the sake of simplicity we are assuming that the first two fields are correctly sani-
tized, while the third one needs further investigation in order to state whether a stored
XSS is possible – we are assuming that comments are stored in a database.
The attacker could adopt a black-box testing approach, basically based on two steps.
The first step consists of reverse engineering the filter to identify which HTML tags and
attributes are allowed to be supplied. The second step consists of injecting malicious
HTML elements by looking for a flaw that would allow to execute arbitrary JavaScript.
3Mozilla, Security/CSP/Specification, https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/CSP/Specification
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Figure 2.1: Scenario 1: Blog comment I
In addition, the attacker could detect the context in which the injection is reflected
– for instance within a P element, i.e. <p>UNTRUSTED DATA</p> – and it can take
advantage of this information in order to identify a successful bypass.
This example is a classical scenario in which a stored XSS can be detected. The more
perverse, creative and modern is the set of employed attack vectors, the more likely
XSS vulnerabilities can be spotted. The set of attack vectors is a key point for XSS
detection scanners; in particular HTML5 introduced a plethora of advanced ways for
executing JavaScript code, therefore throwing an entire (outdated) XSS cheatsheet at
the target is surely not a winning approach.
A much more complex scenario would be a modified one in which multiple steps have to
performed before landing on the reflection page; however this case could be successfully
addressed via a workflow-based approach as shown in iSTAR [Kor10].
Scenario 2: Blog Comment II By considering the previous example, we can assume that
the username and the comment fields are correctly sanitized, while the one accepting
the visitor’s URL need to be significantly tested for detecting whether a stored XSS
vulnerability can be triggered (Figure 2.2).
In this case the attacker would inject a random string in the URL field and look for
its presence within the reflection page. Since the reflection context will obviously be
the attribute href of an anchor, knowing which are the allowed schemes would give a
precious information during the black-box testing.
Some web application scanners would treat this specific data entry point without mak-
ing any distinction from the other ones; this implies that something like
<script>alert(1)</script> is likely to be injected, but it will never trigger an XSS
because of the context in which the injection will fall.
Smarter scanners would try to break the attribute href and inject an event attribute,
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Figure 2.2: Scenario 2: Blog comment II
but this may not be accurate in terms of correctness. By assuming for instance that
the reflection context is the attribute value of an INPUT element, whose type is set to
hidden, then the unique chance to perform a successful injection consists of breaking
the HTML element, an on*4 attribute would not execute malicious JavaScript at all.
The most accurate approach consists of injecting malicious URIs, such as javascript,
feed5 and data6 URIs, and reproducing the victim’s behavior, who clicks the injected
anchor.
At this point we can assume the target web application disallows malicious URIs by
a naive filtering logic, which consists of splitting the supplied URL by the colon
character and looking whether the scheme is disallowed (blacklist approach). It is
straightforward to guess that no bypass can be realized with something like data:
text/html,%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E. The attacker needs to somehow
obfuscate the payload in order to bypass the XSS filter, a string like d&#x61;t&#x61;
&colon;text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg== is very likely
to be identified as an harmless input, whereby automated scanners have to take into
account the possibility to use different encoding techniques too.
For the sake of completeness, since the adopted filtering logic is really trivial an in-
jection such as data&#58;text/html,%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E would
4on* is an abbreviation referring to the HTML event attributes, such as onclick, onmouseover, onkeyup and
so on.
5<a href=feed:javascript:alert(1)>click me</a> executes Javascript if clicked
in Firefox (up to version 13) – Soroush, D., Drag and Drop XSS in Firefox by
HTML5 (Cross Domain in frames), http://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2011/12/
drag-and-drop-xss-in-firefox-by-html5-cross-domain-in-frames/ (Dec 2011)
6data URIs inherit the domain of the opening page in Firefox and Opera – Kotowicz, K., The sad
state of DOM security (or how we all ruled Mario’s challenge), http://blog.kotowicz.net/2011/10/
sad-state-of-dom-security-or-how-we-all.html (Oct 2011)
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Figure 2.3: Scenario 3: Profile’s details viewer
have resulted in a bypass too.
Basically we showed that the reflection context is particularly important in XSS test-
ing, moreover the in-browser scanner concept is really effective in the case we want to
reproduce both sides of an attack: the injection by the attacker and the interaction
with the “malicious component” by the victim.
Scenario 3: Profile’s details viewer Let us consider the target blog employes a web page
which allows to show some details about registered users; it accepts an HTTP GET
parameter whose content must be a username. We assume that the reflection context is
a JavaScript variable such as var a = "My name is UNTRUSTED DATA !"; and we would
like to know whether a reflected XSS is possible (Figure 2.3).
Since the injection falls within a JavaScript variable, it does not make sense to inject
something like <script>alert(1)</script>, nevertheless the attacker could break
the variable or directly close the SCRIPT element. However many details have to be
taken into account in order to understand whether quotes are escaped and the way
this has place.7 Injecting ";alert(1) would not be enough to trigger an XSS as a
JavaScript error would appear: we would need to comment out the rest of the string.
The most accurate way to automate this process consists of injecting several ad-hoc
attack vectors, by taking into account the reflection context and the way special char-
acters, such as double quotes, are escaped.
Our tool is able to handle reflected XSS testing too and in the shown scenario it
basically breaks the JavaScript variable and it automatically comments out the rest.
Since alert(1) is likely to be somehow blacklisted, it performs multiple injections with
obfuscated payloads, such as ∖u0061∖u006c∖u0065∖u0072∖u0074(1).8
7Barron, J., Anatomy of an XSS Injection, https://blog.whitehatsec.com/
anatomy-of-an-xss-injection/ (April 2011)
Barron, J., Escaping Escapes, https://blog.whitehatsec.com/escaping-escapes/ (April 2011)
8∖u0061∖u006c∖u0065∖u0072∖u0074(1) is equivalent to alert(1) unicode encoded
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Chapter 3
Methodology and Tools
The main goal of this work is to show a promising approach for significantly testing XSS
filters. Since the attacker might need to make many steps before having an XSS vulnerability
triggered, it is useful to employ a stateful approach, which is based on the idea of recording
a chain of user actions. In addition, having access to the web pages’ DOM avoids useless
injections and prevents data noises, i.e. false positives.
3.1 Stateful approach for penetration testing
The existing stateless penetration testing tools revealed to be often unsuccessful since the
intended workflows may be hard to define in applications that use AJAX. Pavlosoglou [9]
showed that given a login prompt, it is possible to automate a brute-force attack with a long
list of passwords by using Selenium IDE1 [10]; the advantage of such an approach consists
of quickly assessing successful or failed logins, and, in the case of SQL-Injection testing, it
allows to know all filter evasion characters and successful payloads. Obviously it is required
to define a sequence of actions, that basically generate the login use case, and to find out a
way to distinguish whether a login is successful or whether a SQL-injection is triggered.
We adopted these concepts to replicate the attacker’s behavior through events within the
web browser. The necessary steps to generate an injection and to look for its reflection are
represented by use cases – as similarly shown in [Kor10] – which are actually XML files,
whose content looks like a sequence of Selenium commands (refer to the next section for
details).
This methodology puts a huge advantage since the test can be performed without deacti-
vating CSRF2 protection mechanisms as every request is naturally generated within the web
browser.
1Selenium IDE, http://seleniumhq.org/projects/ide/
2“CSRF” is the abbreviation for Cross-Site Request Forgery: a web application vulnerability where the
attacker can force the victim into triggering actions that it did not want to perform
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Furthermore, we decided to give the possibility to perform reflected XSS testing too. In this
case the specific HTTP GET parameter to test and the target URL are required.
3.2 Selenium: automating web browsers
Selenium is a web application testing system allowing to reproduce a set of operations in
the web browser context. It is able to run in many browser and operating systems and can
be easily controlled through many programming languages. The aim of automating a web
browser may vary according to the needs and developers could find really useful to record
and playback a chain of operations for simulating the visitors’ behavior through the applica-
tion, whereas security professionals could exploit its capabilities for driving the browser into
reproducing the behavior of an attacker.
The WebDriver3 is a software giving a programming interface whose goal is to offer the
possibility of making direct calls to the browser using the browsers’ native support for au-
tomation. In practice for each supported browser there is a driver, which sends commands
to it, and retrieves its results. Since many programming languages are supported, few lines
of code could be used to automate the selected web browser for realizing a complete test
against a web application.
Eventually, automating browsers through Selenium could deeply improve the test process
since a complete set of automation functionalities are accessible in a very easy fashion.
Furthermore, since quick reproduction of security issues is absolutely possible, security pro-
fessionals could send the vendor a script which reproduces the attack procedure and makes
him quickly aware of the threat, without possibly incurring in misunderstandings.
3.3 Reflection context
As shown in Chapter 1, the reflection context, that is the exact point in the HTML code of the
injected page in which the injection falls, is a precious information for better understanding
which are the most appropriate attack vectors to be employed. Many web application security
scanners handle each data entry point in the same way, without considering the possibility
to take decisions during the test in order to select the attack vectors more likely to trigger
an XSS vulnerability.
Our tool uses XPath queries on the DOM tree to identify the exact reflection context and it
specializes the attack on this basis. Let us assume a scenario in which the injection falls within
a P element, then a XPath query like //*[text[contains(.,’random_injection’)]] will
inform us that the reflection context is the text of a tag P.
JavaScript functions are instead adopted when running in Internet Explorer as advanced
3Selenium WebDriver, http://seleniumhq.org/docs/03_webdriver.html
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XPath queries do not return successfully, thereafter the DOM is inspected through client-
side scripting code.4
As shown in Table 3.1, many contexts have been taken into account, starting from the
Abridged XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet.5 Note that many other possible contexts have been
considered.
Basically snuck makes at first a harmless injection with a random string, then it detects
the reflection context and eventually it starts the malicious injections with a set of targeted
attack vectors. Since there are many cases in which XSS vulnerabilities need user interaction
to be triggered – i.e. click a malicious link or an HTML element with an onclick attribute –
the tool detects the injected “component” after each injection and interacts with it in order
to reproduce the victim’s behavior; XPath queries are employed for this latter task too.
We will show an exhaustive example in Chapter 4.
3.4 Sets of attack vectors
Attack vectors are categorized on the basis of the reflection context and four different classes
have been selected:
HTML payloads. They are basically useful when the reflection context is the HTML body.
Malicious URIs. data and javascript URIs trying to execute JavaScript code. Useful when
the injection falls in attributes such as src or href.
Javascript alerts. alert(1) and similar payloads. Useful when the attacker is able to break
a JavaScript variable or to inject an on* attribute.
Expression payloads. Payloads using the CSS extension expression. Useful when the in-
jection falls in a style attribute in Internet Explorer.
Several attack vectors are considered for each of these classes; we assume that the bigger
is the vectors’ set, the more likely an XSS vulnerability can be spotted. In addition, obfusca-
tion methods are taken into account for filter evasion: HTML entities and several encodings
techniques are used within the attack vectors’ set to significantly test robust defenses too.
As many different situations can arise, snuck performs some adjustments to the attack vec-
tors before injecting them; for instance let us assume the reflection context is the textual
content of a TITLE element, then it will inject the HTML payloads vectors, prepending
them with </title>.
Detailed information about obfuscation and really fascinating web browsers’ quirks are re-
ported in an excellent book by Heiderich et al. [HVNEL10].
4Selenium Web Driver gives the possibility to execute JavaScript code in the context of the loaded web page
5OWASP, Abridged XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Abridged_XSS_
Prevention_Cheat_Sheet
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Reflection Context Code Sample Specialized Injection
Sample
HTML Body <span>UNTRUSTED
DATA</span>
<img src=xx:x
onerror=alert(1)
/>
marquee, style, xmp,
title, etc. content
<title>UNTRUSTED
DATA</title>
</title><img
src=xx:x
onerror=alert(1)
/>
HTML Attributes <input type="text"
name="fname"
value="UNTRUSTED
DATA">
" onclick=alert(1)//
GET Parameter <a
href="/search?value=
UNTRUSTED
DATA">clickme</a>
" onclick=alert(1)//
Untrusted URL in a
SRC or HREF at-
tribute
<a href="UNTRUSTED
URL">clickme</a>
javascript:alert(1)
<iframe
src="UNTRUSTED URL"
/>
CSS value <div style="width:
UNTRUSTED
DATA;">X</div>
expression(alert(1));
JavaScript Variable <script>var
currentValue="UNTRUSTED
DATA";</script>
";alert(1)//
Table 3.1: Reflection contexts and specialized injections. For each point, in which the injec-
tion may fall in, we can identify a specialized attack payload; the table shows the most basic
and common contexts only, many others have been omitted.
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3.5 Multiple browsers approach
Since modern web browsers have different capabilities and offer several ways to trigger a
Cross-Site Scripting attack – as widely shown in the HTML5 Security Cheatsheet – we de-
cided to give the tester the possibility to choose which web browser he wants to run the
test with; at the moment the choice is among Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and Internet
Explorer.
The basic idea is that each attack vector may execute malicious code in a web browser A,
but it may not in another web browser B, and/or C.
Classical web vulnerability scanners do not work in-browser, thereafter they use to inject
very common and browser-independent attack vectors. Actually a complete and reliable scan
would require to cover all the major web browsers in order to state that the considered XSS
filter is not affected by any flaw in any “browser-context”.
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Chapter 4
snuck ’s Architecture
This chapter describes the tool’s architecture by presenting its basic components, and shows
some examples for better understanding the way it works.
4.1 snuck ’s architecture
The snuck tool has been implemented in Java, since this language is supported through
Selenium Remote Control drivers. As explained in the previous chapters, the core of the
proposed approach consists of retrieving the reflection context to perform a specialized at-
tack; thus XPath queries are used through the Selenium WebDriver, which allows to have
complete access to the DOM tree.
The architecture of snuck is shown in Figure 4.1. The XSS Injector works as core of the
injection process, it asks the Use Case Parser to parse the Selenium commands within the
XML file given in input (Step I), and to translate them into browser events through the
Controller (Step II). Once the first harmless injection has been made, the latest landed web
page (reflection page) is inspected in order to retrieve the reflection context. The XSS Injec-
tor will use this information for selecting the specific Set of Attack Vectors (Step III) and
starting the malicious injections. At the end of each injection the tool waits for alert windows
and reproduces the victim’s behavior, if needed (Step IV). Successful injections and reverse
engineering information are treated by the injector component, which eventually composes
a detailed HTML report about the discovered vulnerabilities (Step V).
4.2 Designing Use Cases
As shown in Figure 4.1, the penetration tester has to write the use case and give it as input
to the tool. Login use cases can be also used in order to perform an authentication before
making malicious injections.
We distinguish two types of XML configuration files, a first one in which a sequence of op-
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Figure 4.1: snuck ’s architecture and injection process
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erations is given, as reported in Appendix A.1, and a second one for reflected XSS testing.
Appendix A.2 shows a very simple example, that basically contains the target URL, the
fixed GET parameters and the one we need to test.
Let us assume to target an XSS filter which accepts content through a form, which asks the
user to supply its own email, then we can easily design the use case as reported in Listing 4.1.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
<root >
<post >
<parameters >
<parameter >
<name >email </name >
<value >myemail_for_testing@test.org </value >
</parameter >
</parameters >
<commands >
<command >
<name >open </name >
<target >http:// target.foo </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=email </target >
<value >${RANDOM_EMAIL }</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=content </target >
<value >${INJECTION }</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >submit </name >
<target >id=comment </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
</commands >
</post >
</root >
Listing 4.1: Use case sample in which a simple form is filled and submitted
The example shows that the tester could manage the definition of parameters, such as an
email, through the element parameter, which needs two children, name and value; referring
to these may be performed via placeholders in the form of ${name}, whereas the tested field
need to be populated with the placeholder ${INJECTION}. Commands are supplied in the
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form of Selenium tuples through the tag named command.
In the aforementioned web page we would have the following HTML code (Listing 4.2) –
hosted at http://target.foo – as you can understand from the selectors used within the
tags named target.
<form action="post.php" method="POST" id="comment">
<input type="email" name="email" />
<input type="content" />
<input type="submit" value="OK" />
</form >
Listing 4.2: Injected sample form’s HTML code
At this point we assume to target a web page, which accepts an HTTP GET parameter
named xss testing. Designing an XML configuration file is again straightforward, however
we can avoid writing it manually by just writing two parameters in the command line, in
particular -reflected followed by the targeted URL and -p followed by the parameter to
inject, xss testing.
Many other examples are reported in the tutorial, that is reachable from the snuck ’s web
site.
4.3 Modular set of attack vectors
Attack vectors are stored in textual files, categorized as shown in Section 3.4. For any of the
four types there exists a corresponding textual file, fully describing, one per line, possible
injections. The penetration tester is allowed to add new vectors by just appending further
lines to the corresponding file; such repositories are stored in a directory named payloads.
Placeholders could be used inside the set of vectors categorized as HTML Payloads. For
instance, if we add the line <script src=data:,%alert%></script> to the list of vectors,
then the tool will consider the string %alert% as a placeholder and it will replace it by a
JavaScript alert chosen at random among the vectors categorized as JavaScript alerts.
Something like <svg onload=%uri%> will be treated similarly, however the random choice
will happen among the URIs vectors.
By moving to this direction, the tester could easily populate the set of injections without
specifically selecting the payloads that will be supplied.
4.4 Reverse Engineering process
Reverse engineering an XSS filter [11] is a useful task for detecting what is allowed to be
supplied in terms of HTML elements and attributes. This process consists of injecting several
HTML elements with attributes and checking whether they are reported in the reflection
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page; an alternative process is performed when the injection falls in attributes such as href
and src, this is basically based on recognizing the allowed schemes.
The reverse engineering process is carried out through HtmlUnit,1 which is the fastest and
most lightweight implementation of Selenium WebDriver. In practice it is a browser without
GUI, that allows to emulate the behavior of a real web browser supporting JavaScript,
by reconstructing the web pages’ DOM in main memory; thereafter no browser window is
showed once the HTMLUnit driver is started.
We adopted this approach for the reverse engineering process since no particular web browser
capabilities are required and, as said above, the aforementioned driver boasts of outstanding
performance, so that a successful reverse process quickly gets to the end in few seconds.
The subsequent test – i.e. the malicious injections – is instead performed through the
chosen web browser by using its own Selenium Web Driver. This obviously means that a web
browser window is opened and the selected operations are automatically performed by the
web driver; the web application’s behavior is immediately showed to the tester during the
injection process.
Furthermore, since the web driver runs very quickly, the tester might find quite difficult to
understand the way the application responds to the injections, it may be worthy to introduce
a delay between two consecutive injections by starting snuck with the argument -delay (see
Appendix A.3 for the command line manual).
4.5 Victim’s behavior reproduction
The victim’s behavior reproduction is regulated by the XSS Injector component, which makes
XPath queries in order to detect the specific point to interact with; obviously this task is
performed for user interaction attack vectors only, such as malicious URIs and event handler
attributes.
Let us assume the reflection context is the attribute href of an anchor, then malicious URIs
will be retrieved through a XPath query, such as //a[@href=’INJECTION’]. By asking the
driver to look for such an element in the reflection’s page DOM, we can firstly understand
whether the injection is reflected, and secondly retrieve the correspondent anchor to click
on.
For the sake of completeness, if the attacker is able to break an HTML attribute in order to in-
ject an event handler, then a XPath query such as //*[contains(@onclick,’INJECTION’)]
is trivially adopted.
In addition, the tool distinguishes two possible operations with respect to the web ap-
plication’s database, INSERT and UPDATE. The first one is detected when two (or more)
sequential injections are both reported in the reflection page, so by making a first injection
1Selenium, HtmlUnit Driver, http://code.google.com/p/selenium/wiki/HtmlUnitDriver
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A and a second injection B, then both are reported in the same reflection page; this is quite
common in the case the target application runs a forum. The second case is detected when
each injection is independent from the others, thus the second injection B will replace the
previous injection A.
At the end of each injection the tool waits for one or more alert windows on the basis of the
detected operation. Obviously the web browser might be flooded by alert windows whenever
the operation is detected as an INSERT and the XSS filter is too weak, whereby a threshold
has been set in order to stop the test after a certain number of successful injections.
4.6 Run example
We present in Table 4.1 the way the tool operates with respect to the Scenario 2 shown in
Section 2.2. Many steps are involved to generate a complete and reliable scan, eventually an
HTML report is returned for the inspection of the results.
Operation
Start HtmlUnit
Inject a random alphanumeric string to check whether the injection is reflected
The XSS filter won’t probably reflect the injection as it is not a correct URL
Inject a random numeric string to check whether the injection is reflected
The XSS filter won’t probably reflect the injection as is is not a correct URL
Inject a URL to check whether the injection is reflected
The XSS filter will accept it and reflect it in the reflection page
The reflection context is retrieved =>attribute href of an HTML element, A
The reverse engineering process is started, many correct URLs with different
schemes are injected in order to understand which protocols are allowed
Detect the operation (INSERT OR UPDATE, see section 4.5 for information)
Quit HtmlUnit
The chosen web browser is started
Check whether the attribute href is breakable
Start injecting several malicious payloads, such as javascript:alert(1), and click
the resulting anchors
If href is breakable, then inject on* attributes and eventually try to break the
attribute for injecting new HTML elements
The web browser is closed
An HTML report is generated
Table 4.1: snuck ’s run example with respect to the Scenario 2 shown in Section 2.2
29
Chapter 5
Experimental Results
One goal of this study is to evaluate the XSS injection approach and the tool snuck proposed
in this paper. We selected many popular open source CMSs1 and we performed several test
against them.
The next sections illustrate how the tests were carried out and the experimental results we
found out.
5.1 Designing and starting the test
As shown in the previous sections, the penetration tester is required to define a sequence
of operations to be performed by filling in a use case, thereafter it needs to select which
specific path, within the web application, connects the injection page to the reflection one.
Obviously a basic understanding about the way the application works is required to discover
the correlation among different web pages.
In our empirical study we selected some of the most common operations, that use to be tasty
from the attacker’s perspective. In other words we performed many tests against procedures
that make the application accept user-generated content and reflect it.
We filled in the use cases manually as it is extremely easy and intuitive to write them.
5.2 Test results
This section will present point by point the results we found out in several CMSs and blogging
platforms. All the shown vulnerabilities were responsibly reported to the vendors and part
of these have been fixed. Much more detailed advisories are reported in some cases as well;
please note that since snuck was under development and in a non-public phase at the time
of making these experiments, you will not find any trace of it in the online advisories.
1CMS stands for Content Management System
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Test Results
<a href="feed:javascript:alert(1)">CLICK ME</a>
<a href="feed:data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>">CLICK ME</a>
Table 5.1: Test results in WordPress 3.3.1 : XSS filter for visitors’ comments
WordPress. WordPress2 is the most popular open source blogging platform, basically it
allows to publish posts where visitors can leave comments. Since comments may con-
tain a subset of HTML elements, we decided to significantly test the HTML filter that
is used, wp kses3. This latter employs a whitelist approach to sanitize the input, which
makes sure that only the allowed HTML element names, attribute names, attribute
values and only sane HTML entities can occur within the supplied comment.
We performed the test inWordPress 3.3.1 by employing the use case in Appendix A.4;
the basic idea was to give the tool some logically correct inputs to be supplied through
the HTML form accepting the visitor’s information and the comment. Actually the
injection page is the same as the reflection page since supplied comments are reflected
within the page with the “Leave a new comment” form. In addition, no other steps
need to be done before landing in the reflection page: the injection process consists of
two steps, populate and submit the form, and inspect the reflection page for detecting
XSS issues.
Since WordPress adopts an anti-flooding mechanism in order to stop bots to continu-
ously insert comments, we started snuck with the argument -delay.
The reverse engineering process gave us some information that we were already aware
of since we previously inspected the filter’s PHP code: basically neither harmful ele-
ments nor event handler attributes are allowed. Instead the malicious test reported a
stored XSS vulnerability while running in Firefox (Table 5.1).
Obviously the reason why this is allowed is related to the fact that the feed scheme
is considered harmless; unfortunately Firefox (up to version 13) executes JavaScript
when encountering a sequence of feed: followed by a “malicious” protocol.
This issue was fixed in WordPress 3.3.2 ; detailed information about the fix and how
to exploit this in order to manage a privilege escalation attack are accessible online.4
Habari. Habari5 is a quite popular blogging platform, its functionalities are more or less
the same as the WordPress ones. We focused on the filter used against the visitors’
comments (use case in Appendix A.5). Unfortunately, the malicious test returned that
2WordPress, http://wordpress.org/
3WordPress, Function Reference/wp kses, http://codex.wordpress.org/Function_Reference/wp_kses
4Gentile, M., Multiple vulnerabilities in Wordpress, http://www.sneaked.net/
multiple-vulnerabilities-in-wordpress
5Habari Project, http://habariproject.org/en/
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Reflection Context
<a href="UNTRUSTED_DATA/">[...]</a>
Table 5.2: Symphony 2.2.5, URL field for visitors’ comments – reflection context
no XSS is possible (Habari 0.8 ), while the reverse engineering process allowed us to
infer that a white-list approach is used to sanitize the input; actually the InputFilter
class makes sure that only sane input is reflected, however harmful HTML elements,
such as iframe6, are allowed in the case no attributes are supplied.
snuck found out this oddity when reverse engineering the filter: the attacker may
supply a comment whose content is <iframe> to basically break the reflection page’s
output as the filter does not successfully handle unclosed tags.
Symphony CMS. Symphony7 is a XSLT8-powered open source content management sys-
tem, it is very popular among users who want a widely customizable CMS. We pro-
ceeded our survey on XSS filters against users’ comments with the one employed by
this web application, xssfilter.9 Basically we conducted two different test (Symphony
2.2.5 ), in the first one we injected the comment field (similar to Scenario I in chapter
2), in the second one the URL field (similar to Scenario II in Chapter 2, with use case
in Appendix A.6).
 Testing the comment field. In this case the injection page is the same as the
reflection pages, so the main purpose of snuck is to populate the HTML form
accepting the users’ information with the right input and to inject the comment
field. The detected reflection context is a P html element as expected, thereafter
HTML Payloads are adopted for the attack.
No positive results were reported since HTMLPurifier is adopted for sanitization
purposes, while xssfilter works as a detection layer, stopping requests containing
malicious inputs.
 Testing the URL field. Positive results were returned when testing the field ac-
cepting the visitors’ web site. snuck successfully reversed the XSS filter by finding
out the allowed schemes, as the reflection context is the attribute href an A el-
ement (Table 5.2), and it eventually discovered two different ways to bypass it
(Table 5.3).
Actually the vulnerability was related to an incomplete regular expression in xssfilter :
supplied URLs are marked as harmful and blocked through a black-list approach. At
6Habari, inputfilter.php, http://doc.habariproject.org/inputfilter_8php_source.html#l00073
7Symphony CMS, http://getsymphony.com/
8XSLT stands for Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XSLT
9Symphony CMS, xssfilter, https://github.com/symphonycms/xssfilter
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Test Results
data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==
data:text/html,%3csvg%20onload=alert%281%29%3e
feed:data:text/html,%3csvg%20onload=alert%281%29%3e
Table 5.3: Test results in Symphony 2.2.5 – detected XSS
the moment of this writing the vulnerabilities were not yet fixed; although we reported
many other really severe security issues, just few reflected XSS were fixed in Symphony
2.3.
GetSimple. GetSimple10 is an “XML based, stand-a-alone, fully independent and lite Con-
tent Management System”; we selected this one (GetSimple 3.1 ) among many others
because it is quite trivial to understand how it works. In addition, it widely adopts
HTTP GET parameters for its operations, thus it might be a good candidate for eval-
uating the way our tool works with respect to reflected XSS.
We mixed our approach with the typical one used by web application security scanners
and we started crawling the application by extracting every HTTP GET parameter,
and we eventually treated them as data entry points. We gave them as input to snuck.
Although this approach revealed to be really time consuming, it returned many vulner-
able parameters. In particular, no advanced payloads were needed to execute malicious
code, <iframe src=javascript:alert(document.cookie)// would have been enough.
At the moment of this writing these vulnerabilities were not yet fixed.
Plone. Plone is an open source CMS written in Python that “has the best security track
record of any major CMS”.11 We managed some experiments as shown in the previous
cases, in particular against the XSS filter for the user-generated content, i.e. comments
to public posts. Tests were conducted in Plone 4.4.1 (use case in Appendix A.7), in
which we setted the “comment text transform parameter” to Markdown.
Basically the XSS filter (Safe HTML12) is pretty gentle, besides no event handlers are
allowed and no malicious schemes can be supplied, potentially harmful tags can be
injected. Since random attributes are not filtered out, we could infer that a black-list
approach is used with respect to HTML elements, while a white-list with respect to
attributes.
Eventually our tool returned three attack vectors, they were strictly related to each
other as they all exploited the same bug (Table 5.4).
Actually the HTML5 named character reference &colon; (U+0003A COLON) is not
decoded by the filter into a colon character, thus bypassing it. This latter looks for
10GetSimple, http://get-simple.info/
11Plone, http://plone.org/
12Plone, HTML Filtering options, http://plone.org/documentation/kb/filteringhtml
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Test Results
<a hrEf=d&#x61;t&#x61;&colon;text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydC
gxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==>_DUMmY_9701
<A HrEf=javascript&colon;alert(1)>_DummY_62502
<A hrEF=feed:javascript&colon;alert(1)>_dUMMy_59371
<meta name="Description" content="0;url=d&#x61;t&#x61;&colon;text
/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==" HTTP-EQUIV=
"refresh">
<meta name="Description" content="0;url=javascript&colon;alert(1)"
HTTP-EQUIV="refresh">
Table 5.4: Test results in Plone 4.1.4 – detected XSS by combining the results from Firefox
and Chrome
Opera(-only) Attack Vector
<a x="d&#00065;ta&colon;image/svg+xml;charset=utf-8;base64,PHN2Z
yB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvMjAwMC9zdmciPjxzY3JpcHQ%2
BYWxlcnQoMSk8L3NjcmlwdD48L3N2Zz4NCg==" style="-o-link:attr(x);
-o-link-source:current">click me</a>
Table 5.5: Opera based attack vector in Plone 4.1.4
malicious schemes, such as javascript: and data: without taking into account this
other opportunity of supplying a colon character.
By combining the reversing results with the aforementioned exploits we came out with
two other injections (refer to the last two rows in Table 5.4), which take advantage of
the meta element for generating a malicious redirect.
For the sake of completeness, since the style attribute is absolutely harmless from the
filter’s perspective, we came out with a fascinating Opera based attack vector (Table
5.5).
The shown vulnerabilities were not yet fixed at the moment of this writing, but a patch
will be available very soon.
Breaking XSS filters is absolutely a creative task, which obviously cannot be completely
automated, however the shown experiments prove that successful testing can be performed
through the described approach. We do not present multi-step attacks, where the attacker
would need to follow many steps before landing in the reflection page – i.e. in an e-commerce
web site – but it would not be different from the aforementioned experiments.
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5.3 Evaluation and comparison
This section presents the evaluation of nine modern web vulnerability scanners with respect
to snuck. We crafted five XSS vulnerable web pages, which adopt some very naive filtering
mechanisms and we asked the tools to break these XSS prevention “systems”.
The test suite was composed by an index page (Listing 5.1) and the actual vulnerable pages,
we will refer to these as test A (Listing 5.2), test B (Listing 5.3), test C (Listing 5.4), test D
(Listing 5.5), test E (Listing 5.6).
<!DOCTYPE html >
<html >
<meta charset='utf -8'>
<title >uhhhh?!</title >
<body >
<a href="a.php?x=<b>my_sane_html </b>">click </a>
<a href="b.php?x=localfile.html">click </a>
<a href="c.php?x=00001">click </a>
<a href="d.php?x=user_00001">click </a>
<a href="e.php?x=user_00001">click </a>
</body >
</html >
Listing 5.1: index.html - it points to the actual vulnerable web pages
<!DOCTYPE html >
<html >
<meta charset="utf -8">
<title >uhhhh?!</title >
<body >
<?php
function clean($var){
return strip_tags($var , '<b><i><a>');
}
echo ( (isset($_GET['x']) && !empty($_GET['x']) ) ? clean($_GET['x'])
: "O.o");
?>
</body >
</html >
Listing 5.2: a.php - reflected XSS vulnerable web page
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<!DOCTYPE html >
<html >
<meta charset="utf -8">
<title >uhhhh?!</title >
<body >
<?php
function clean($var){
return preg_replace(array("/:/", "/\"/"), array("", ""), $var);
}
?>
<a href="<?php echo ( ( isset($_GET['x ']) && !empty($_GET['x ']) ) ?
clean($_GET['x ']) : "O.o" ); ?>">click me </a>
</body >
</html >
Listing 5.3: b.php - reflected XSS vulnerable web page
<!DOCTYPE html >
<html >
<meta charset="utf -8">
<title >uhhhh?!</title >
<body >
<script >
var z = "user_ <?php
echo ( (isset($_GET['x ']) && !empty($_GET['x ']) ) ? clean($_GET['x '])
: "O.o");
?>";
</script >
<?php
function clean($var){
return preg_replace(array("/\"/", "/script/"), array("\\\"",""),
$var);
}
?>
</body >
</html >
Listing 5.4: c.php - reflected XSS vulnerable web page
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<!DOCTYPE html >
<html >
<meta charset="utf -8">
<title >uhhhh?!</title >
<body >
<script >
<?php
echo "// xxx ".( (isset($_GET['x']) && !empty($_GET['x']) ) ?
clean($_GET['x']) : "O.o")." xxx";
?>
</script >
<?php
function clean($var){
return preg_replace(array("/script/"), array(""), $var);
}
?>
</body >
</html >
Listing 5.5: d.php - reflected XSS vulnerable web page
<!DOCTYPE html >
<html >
<meta charset="utf -8">
<title >uhhhh?!</title >
<body >
<input type="hidden" value="<?php echo ( isset($_GET['x ']) &&
!empty($_GET['x ']) ) ? preg_replace("/>/", "", $_GET['x ']) : "O.o";
?>" />
</body >
</html >
Listing 5.6: e.php - reflected XSS vulnerable web page
Practically speaking, the aforementioned pages strip out potential harmful characters
from the HTTP GET parameters’ value and reflect the “sanitized” content, therefore neither
validation nor contextual output encoding are performed. This could obviously lead to XSS
attacks in the case the attacker is smart enough to produce a successful attack vector.
Test A The PHP function strip tags()13 represents one of the most basic way to naively
clean user-supplied HTML. Actually this function cannot supply a solid protection
against XSS attacks as it does not validate attributes at all and it requires a series of
regular expressions that strip out event handler attributes.14
13PHP: strip tags, http://php.net/manual/en/function.strip-tags.php
14Is strip tags() horribly unsafe?, http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/10011/
is-strip-tags-horribly-unsafe
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Test B The page expects to receive a local URL, by stripping out colon characters; moreover
it makes sure that no quotes are reflected. This is a quite common scenario in which
the web developer does not want to give users the chance to supply a scheme, such as
http:, https:, ftp: and so on.
Test C The HTTP GET parameter is reflected in a double quoted JavaScript variable, the
protection consists of putting a backslash before quotes; closing the script element is
not allowed.
Test D The HTTP GET parameter is reflected in a single-line JavaScript comment, the
basic protection is performed by stripping out the script keyword.
Test E This example is a little bit subtle, basically the reflection happens in the attribute
value of an element input, but the type is set to hidden. Since modern web browsers
do not allow to override the attribute type15 and fixed any possibility to make the
input visible through the attribute style, the unique chance to execute malicious code
consists of breaking the attribute and injecting a new HTML element executing the
payload.
We selected nine web application security scanners and snuck for our test, the selection
was made on the basis of the results gained in “The Web Application Vulnerability Scanners
Benchmark, 2012”.16
Acunetix WVS Free Edition 8 (build 20120808) The free version of Acunetix WVS17
allows to detect XSS vulnerabilities only, thereafter it is sufficient for our purposes.
OWASP ZAP 1.4.1 OWASP ZAP18 acts as a proxy intercepting requests to web appli-
cations; by starting the active scan option against the visited web pages, it is able to
discover vulnerabilities which are identified by alerts.
Ironwasp 0.9.1.4 We’ve already mentioned Ironwasp19 in the previous chapters, it is a pen-
etration testing suite, which covers the most common security vulnerabilities. More-
over, it boasts of a DOM based XSS detection engine, that is based on JavaScript
static analysis.
15If override was possible, then injecting " type=image src=xx:x onerror=alert(1) " would trigger
an XSS
16Chen, S., The Web Application Vulnerability Scanners Benchmark, 2012, http://sectooladdict.
blogspot.it/2012/07/2012-web-application-scanner-benchmark.html
17Acunetix WVS, http://www.acunetix.com/vulnerability-scanner/features.htm
18OWASP ZAP, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project
19Ironwasp, http://ironwasp.org/
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ProxyStrike 2.2 ProxyStrike20 acts similarly to OWASP ZED, it is actually a proxy that
analyzes the exchanged parameters in background mode and possibly detects security
issues.
SandCat Mini 4.4.3.0 Syhunt Mini21 is a web application security scanner which performs
several injections and attempts in order to discover issues.
ParosPro Desktop Edition 1.9.12 ParosPro22 is a fully automated web application se-
curity scanner, which is basically composed by a crawler module, an attack component
and an analysing module.
Arachni 0.4.0.2 Arachni23 is a free web application security scanner framework, which
boasts of a graphical interface through a web application which allows to start a scan
and handle reports.
XSSSNIPER XSSSNIPER24 is an automatic XSS discovery tool, it allows to perform mass
scanning against web applications in a very easy fashion.
Xelenium Xelenium25 is a security testing tool, that is able to discover XSS vulnerabilities
by employing Selenium; it practically detects the web pages you want to test by acting
as a proxy and performs injections with respect to the form fields which are present in
these pages. Unfortunately running the aforementioned experiments would not generate
any injection since the tool expects form fields only to identify data entry points.
Although we did not adopt this tool during our test, we decided to discover the way it
practically works by making some basic experiments; we are quite fascinated by this
tool as it seems to be very interesting and quite similar to the one we implemented.
Xelenium works in a very easy fashion, basically it extracts the form fields from the
current web page and it injects them with several attack vectors; if the vector is
perfectly reflected, then an XSS vulnerability is detected. The main drawback is that
the reflection context is not taken into account and injections composed by multiple
steps cannot be defined.
Table 5.6 shows the detection results, “NO” means that the vulnerability wasn’t spotted,
the light green “YES” indicates that the tool discovered the issue but the results need to be
discussed, whereas the green “YES” stands for a successful spot.
Acunetix WVS Acunetix performs injections on the basis of the reflection context; in our
test suite it discovered the issue in test D by injecting a carriage return in order to break
20ProxyStrike, http://www.edge-security.com/proxystrike.php
21SandCat Mini, http://www.syhunt.com/?n=Sandcat.Mini
22ParosPro,http://www.milescan.com/
23Arachni, http://arachni-scanner.com/
24XSSSNIPER, https://bitbucket.org/gbrindisi/xsssniper
25Xelenium, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Xelenium_Project
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test A test B test C test D test E
Acunetix WVS Free Edition NO NO NO YES YES
OWASP ZAP NO YES NO YES YES
IronWasp NO YES NO YES YES
ProxyStrike YES YES YES YES YES
SandCat Mini YES YES YES YES YES
ParosPro NO NO NO YES YES
Arachni NO NO NO NO YES
XSSSNIPER NO NO YES YES NO
snuck YES YES YES YES NO
Table 5.6: Detection results with respect to five reflected XSS vulnerable web pages - read
the paragraph above for the legend.
the single-line JavaScript comment, in particular it reported 922550%0a%28%29%3a%3b
942842 as a successful injection. Furthermore it discovered the XSS in test E and
reported " onmouseover=prompt(927905) bad=", this was obviously not difficult to de-
tect, the main problem is that the injection would not trigger an XSS in modern web
browsers.
OWASP ZAP OWASP ZAP worked correctly with respect to test A by injecting %3Cb+
onMouseOver%3Dalert%281%29%3B%3Etest%3C%2Fb%3E, nevertheless it strangely did not
report the XSS vulnerability. It detected the issue in test B, the problem here is that
the returned injection "><script>alert(1);</script> is obviously improper with
respect to that reflection context; although it is almost perfectly reflected, it cannot
lead to XSS at least in that form. Eventually it worked correctly in test D and test E,
very similarly to Acunetix WVS.
Ironwasp IronWasp worked similarly to Acunetix, but it was able to successfully detect a
Scriptless HTML Injection - not an XSS - in test B by injecting //olxizrk. Further-
more it correctly addressed the issue in test D by reporting %0adzkqivxy%3b%2f* as a
proper injection - note that random characters are injected instead of actual payloads,
for instance it returned " olqpir="vtikr(1)" in test E, which is correct though.
ProxyStrike ProxyStrike correctly detected all the issues. Unfortunately information about
possible attack vectors are not returned, it just reports for each HTTP GET parameter
the potentially harmful characters which are perfectly reflected.
SandCat Mini Syhunt Mini worked similarly to ProxyStrike, by detecting all the issues
but not returning any successful exploit.
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ParosPro ParosPos spotted the last two test, D and E, by respectively returning XSS in
SCRIPT section and XSS w/o angle brackets, which is perfectly legit. However no
possible injection are returned.
Arachni Arachni discovered the XSS in test E. Unfortunately information about possible
injections and the particular type of the issue are not given.
XSSSNIPER XSSSNIPER correctly discovered the XSS in test C and D, by respec-
tively returning %5B%2700001%27%5D and %5B%27user 00001%27%5D as injections. This
tool works by injecting complex random strings which contain potentially harmful
characters and checking whether they are completely reflected; this approach is per-
fectly fair, but it could decrease the detection rate in the case the filtering mechanisms
strips out at least one character.
snuck snuck worked correctly with respect to all the experiments, but the last one. In-
fact it returned many successful injections, it addressed test A with %3Ca%20href%3D
javascript%3Aalert(1)%3Edummy link, test B with javascript%26%2358;alert(1), test
C with %5C%22%3Balert(1)%2F%2F and, eventually, test D with %0D%0Aalert(1)%2F%2F.
The reason why it was not able to manage the issue in test E is related to the fact that
it just reports successful injections, thereafter since no modern web browser is able to
trigger an XSS in that situation, it cannot reproduce a correct exploit.
For the sake of completeness, the malicious payloads just presented are obviously url-
encoded: snuck returns them url decoded, whereby the attacker just has to encode
them before injecting.
The aforementioned experiments indicate that also straightforward XSS vulnerabilities
might be difficult to detect. Although snuck seems to work properly in many situations, it
is conceived to produce a test with respect to a given HTTP GET parameter, whereas web
application security scanners need to discover the parameter before managing an attack.
Actually it appears to be a good approach to adopt snuck for realizing whether a successful
exploit exists and which particular payload would trigger an XSS exploit. In other words it
could be used as a tool for assessing whether, given a possibly vulnerable parameter, it is
really possible to inject it to perform an XSS attack.
Obviously a situation in which multiple steps need to be performed before landing in the
reflection page would be a really different scenario; this might involve a stored XSS vulner-
ability in the case a weak filter is adopted. In this case snuck reveals to be an excellent tool
as web application scanners would likely get in trouble, by having no idea about the way the
application needs to be crossed.
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Chapter 6
Future Work
6.1 Future improvements
The tool we presented in this work is still in an experimental phase. Even if quite stable, it
is however worthy of a few improvements to widen its analysis capabilities. In this chapter
we describe some further features whose implementation has just begun.
Since we were fascinated by the idea of creating an XSS filter breaker service, we came
out with the idea in which users can remotely ask snuck to perform an XSS test against a
certain web site, by just uploading an XML configuration file: the tool will be automatically
started, will perform the required test and eventually will make the related report available.
Nevertheless such an architecture would require that the applicant certifies he is the target
web site’s owner, and the complexity of such a system discouraged us to realize it.
6.1.1 Client side XSS filter testing
Instead of waiting for every web site to fix its XSS vulnerabilities, modern web browser ven-
dors decided to supply a further security layer, that can mitigate some classes of XSS issues,
i.e. the reflected ones. Bates et al. [BBJ10] widely analyzed the state of the art of client side
XSS filters and proposed an interesting design which has been implemented in XSSAuditor,
that is currently enabled by default in Google Chrome.
Basically these filters block injections by looking for content that is present in both the
HTTP response and the HTTP request that generated the response. It is clear that building
a filter with zero false negatives could really be a challenge, since several attack methodolo-
gies and encoding techniques have to be taken into account. In addition, false positives are
actually possible and the common practice of “mangling” the injected payload by altering
the HTTP response may give place to XSS on natively safe web pages, as shown by Nava et
al. [12] with the Internet Explorer 8’s XSS filter.1
1Ross, D., IE 8 XSS Filter Architecture / Implementation, http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/
2008/08/19/ie-8-xss-filter-architecture-implementation.aspx
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We slightly modified our XSS testing tool in order to use it as a tester for client side XSS
filters. We crafted a vulnerable XSS web page, whose purpose was to simply reflect a certain
GET parameter, as show in Listing 6.1.
<?php
echo $_GET["xss"];
?>
Listing 6.1: Sample web page vulnerable to XSS attacks (a)
By starting snuck against the previous vulnerable web page in reflected XSS “mode”, we
are able to detect whether an injection is blocked or not by the adopted web browser’s XSS
filter. In other words if we are able to grab an alert, then we are sure that the client side
XSS filter is bypassed.
No source code changes were needed for performing the test in Internet Explorer 9,2 while
it required to start Google Chrome with XSSAuditor on.3 In the case of Firefox, we just
needed to import the NoScript4 extension before starting the web driver – actually Firefox
has no native client-side XSS filter, fortunately NoScript is a really valid and robust defense
to most common web attacks, for instance clickjacking prevention is also accomplished.
Test were performed through Google Chrome 20.0.1132.57, Internet Explorer 9.0.8 and No-
Script 2.4.4.
No interesting results came out by experimenting with these settings, every attack vector
was correctly blocked by the adopted web browsers. We noticed that XSSAuditor does not
prevent data URIs, nevertheless this cannot be considered as a security issue, as they do not
inherit the privileges of their referrer in Chrome [BBJ10].
Interesting results can be achieved through overflow, that is the case of generating an XSS
vulnerability by exploiting characters that already exist in the page (Listing 6.2).
<script >
var x = "<?php echo $_GET['x ']; ?>";
</script >
Listing 6.2: Sample web page vulnerable to XSS attacks (b)
snuck can be started against the previous web page, located for instance at http:
//127.0.0.1/test/xss.php in the following manner, Listing 6.3.
2Internet Explorer’s XSS filter is enabled by default, you need to disable it before using snuck – we did not
find a way to deactivate it through Selenium Web Driver.
3snuck starts Google Chrome with the flag: --disable-xss-auditor
4Firefox does not have a built-in client side XSS filter, NoScript, http://noscript.net/, is an extension
which provides really robust protection against security vulnerabilities
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> java --jar snuck.jar
-report report.html
-reflected "http ://127.0.0.1/ test/xss.php"
-p x
Listing 6.3: How to start snuck against the page in Listing 6.2
XSSAuditor does not block any malicious payload in the shown example, it just works as
an effective XSS protection if the injection does not take advantage of the reflection context.
Internet Explorer’s XSS filter stops malicious requests by replacing sensitive characters from
the attack vectors with a # character.
IE and NoScript employ a set of regular expressions to detect a potential attack, thereafter
the attacker should find a way to neuter these in order to execute malicious JavaScript.5,6
Basically injections which follows the pattern ”;a(b) are immediately detected, the same
happens when redirecting to javascript or data URIs, i.e. ”;location=.
(Un)fortunately our tool returned an attack vector which works in Internet Explorer, see
Table 6.1. This latter is actually an awesome XSS technique without parentheses, discovered
by Gareth Heyes7, that we added into the list of possible injections for the JavaScript context.
Injection
";onerror=eval;throw'alert\x281\x29';//
Table 6.1: IE XSS filter bypass
For the sake of completeness, we decided to compare the client-side XSS filters’ behavior
with respect to another reflection context, in particular the href attribute of an anchor.
5Multiple excellent evasion techniques against IE and WebKit are showed in http://xss.cx/examples/ie/
internet-exploror-ie9-xss-filter-rules-example-regexp-mshtmldll.txt
6Dalili, S., SecProject Web AppSec Challenge Series 1 Results, http://soroush.secproject.com/blog/
2012/06/challenge-series-1-result-and-conclusion/
7Heyes, G., XSS technique without parentheses, http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2012/05/01/
xss-technique-without-parentheses/
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<a href="<?php echo $_GET['x ']; ?>">
CLICK ME
</a>
Listing 6.4: Sample web page vulnerable to XSS attacks (c)
XSSAuditor does not block any injection in the form of scheme:payload, such as javascript:
alert(1), while Internet Explorer blocks malicious URIs – i.e. javascript and vbscript – by
replacing the r character with a #. NoScript works similar to IE, it modifies the attack vec-
tors in order to transform them into an harmless form, nevertheless data URIs are allowed
and attackers could take advantage of this to trigger an XSS by using the base64 encoding.
Further investigation and analysis would be obviously required for testing client-side XSS
filters. Many security researchers are working on this point trying to continuously break
them: wonderful examples are given by Kinugawa, who discovered several interesting bugs8
in NoScript ; the same holds for Heiderich, who found out several bypass techniques, some
examples are reported in his excellent PhD thesis [Hei12].
Our idea was to employ a slightly modified version of snuck in order to use it as an evasion
tool for testing client-side XSS filters. Since this task would require a kind of fuzzing ap-
proach, it would be useful to employ a set of fuzzed9 attack vectors.
Moreover, multiple parameters injections are likely to result in a client-side XSS filter eva-
sion, thus future works would require to extend the tool to managing multiple injection
points.
6.2 Main limitations
Despite the potential of the presented approach for significantly testing XSS filters, some
drawbacks should be taken into account.
Running a complete test against a filter requires time, which is proportional to the number
of malicious vectors the tool will employ; basically using the Selenium Web Driver instead
of writing a web browser extension is a good chance for covering the most common web
browsers with very limited effort. A web browser extension should be rewritten for each
browser you want to be compatible with, but obviously it would show off better performance
– for instance Websecurify10 is a browser extension which quickly perfoms web application
security testing.
In addition, manually writing a use case for each test reveals to be quite cumbersome and
annoying; however since our purpose was not to present a “point-and-click” scanner, but
a much more customizable tool, realizing a software, which allows the tester to graphically
8Kinugawa, M., NoScript Anti-XSS, http://masatokinugawa.l0.cm/2012/07/noscriptanti-xss18.html
9Shazzer, http://shazzer.co.uk/, could be a valid repository to take the attack vectors from
10Websecurify, http://www.websecurify.com/features
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select the components in a web page to interact with, could be the most accurate solution
to this problem. We omitted this point in the previous section as further investigation is
needed in order to assess whether it is achievable by slightly modifying the Selenium IDE,
web browser extension.
Another problem might arise whenever the tested application uses CAPTCHAs to block
robots to perform automatic operations, such as posting spam comments. In that case the
automation would need to be stopped at any time a CAPTCHA appears, asking the human
intervention.
Finally, we should not forget that snuck is at the moment restricted to a specific set of well
known and predefined injections. This means that bypassing a filter would require to know in
advance a possibly successful injection. This approach is quite fair with respect to common
XSS filters, but it might be unsuccessful against much more complex protection systems;
thereafter it would be really interesting to extend it with a fuzzer module that should be
able to combine HTML tags and attributes, special characters and the available payloads in
order to inject many fuzzed, but reasonable, vectors. This problem could be addressed by
making snuck learn how different encoding techniques could be adopted in several contexts
and by making it aware of how it is possible to combine HTML tags with rational event
handler attributes. Future improvements are moving to this direction.
Eventually, evading filters requires a creative mind and new attack vectors should be con-
tinuously added into the pool of the employed payloads in order to expand the possibilities
to spot an issue.
6.3 Conclusions
The primary goal of this work was to describe an approach for testing XSS filters in an
uncommon way. This opportunity is related to the possibility to use Selenium WebDriver
in order to drive the web browser into making a sequence of operations in which multiple
injections are performed against a targeted web application. Furthermore we focused on the
importance of the reflection context, by hoping that every web application security scanner
vendor will move in this direction; basically no big effort would be required, since XPath
queries or HTML parsers could be successfully used to retrieve the reflection context, however
attack vectors would need to be categorized.
Eventually, approaching the XSS filters evasion problem by following the aforementioned
methodologies might be quite cumbersome in the case the web application adopted multiple
points in which users may marshal content; nevertheless it could be interesting to convert
the tool into a plugin for common web application security scanners, by giving the tester
the chance to perform a targeted test against a filter. Such an approach might significantly
improve the detection of bugs in XSS filters and it would have the huge advantage of covering
the most used web browsers, whereby a huge portion of potential victims.
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Appendix A
Appendix
This appendix contains the use cases employed during the presented experiments and
other details we omitted in the discussion.
A.1 Appendix 1
Sample use case in which a sequence of operation is defined. Note that data are described in
the form of <name, value>.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
<root >
<post >
<parameters >
<parameter >
<name >username </name >
<value >new_test77 </value >
</parameter >
<parameter >
<name >email </name >
<value >new_test77@test.org </value >
</parameter >
</parameters >
<commands >
<command >
<name >open </name >
<target >http://foo.foo </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=author </target >
<value ></value >
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</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=author </target >
<value >${USERNAME}</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=comment </target >
<value >${INJECTION }</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >submit </name >
<target >id=comment </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
</commands >
</post >
</root >
A.2 Appendix 2
Sample XML configuration file for reflected XSS testing. Note that you also can avoid writing
this file and start snuck with the arguments -reflected and -p set. Starting the tool in the
following way will make it achieve the same task without the need of writing the configuration
file.
>java -jar snuck.jar
-report report.html
-reflected "http :// target.foo/xss.php?foo=bar&foo2=bar2"
-p hidden_xss
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
<root >
<get >
<parameters >
<targeturl >http:// target.foo/xss.php </targeturl >
<reflectionurl ></reflectionurl >
<paramtoinject >hidden_xss </ paramtoinject >
<parameter >foo=bar </parameter >
<parameter >foo2=bar2 </parameter >
</parameters >
</get >
</root >
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A.3 Appendix 3
Available options in snuck.
>java -jar snuck.jar
Usage: snuck [-start xmlconfigfile] -config xmlconfigfile
-report htmlreportfile [-d #ms_delay] [-proxy IP:port]
[-chrome chromedriver] [-ie iedriver]
[-remotevectors URL] [-stop -first]
[-reflected targetURL -p parameter_toTest] [-no-multi]
Options:
-start path to login use case (XML file)
-config path to injection use case (XML file)
-report report file name (html extension is required)
-d delay (ms) between each injection
-proxy proxy server (IP:port)
-chrome perform a test with Google Chrome , instead of Firefox
It needs the path to the chromedriver
-ie perform a test with Internet Explorer , instead of Firefox
Disable the built in XSS filter in advance
-remotevectors use an up -to -date online attack vectors ' source
instead of the local one
-stop -first stop the test upon a successful vector is detected
-no-multi deactivate multithreading for the reverse
engineering process - a sequential approach
will be adopted
-reflected perform a reflected XSS test
(without writing the XML config file)
-p HTTP GET parameter to inject
(useful if -reflected is set)
-help show this help menu
A.4 Appendix 4
Use case adopted inWordPress 3.3.1 for testing the filter used against the visitors’ comments.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
<root >
<post >
<parameters >
<parameter >
<name >username </name >
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<value >new_test77 </value >
</parameter >
<parameter >
<name >email </name >
<value >new_test77@test.org </value >
</parameter >
</parameters >
<commands >
<command >
<name >open </name >
<target >http:// 127.0.0.1/ wordpress /?p=1</target >
<value >noforce </value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=author </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=author </target >
<value >${USERNAME}</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=email </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=email </target >
<value >${EMAIL}</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=comment </target >
<value >${INJECTION }</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >submit </name >
<target >id=comment </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
</commands >
</post >
</root >
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A.5 Appendix 5
Use case adopted in Habari 0.8 for testing the filter used against the visitors’ comments.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
<root >
<post >
<parameters >
<parameter >
<name >username </name >
<value >test </value >
</parameter >
<parameter >
<name >email </name >
<value >test@test.org </value >
</parameter >
</parameters >
<commands >
<command >
<name >open </name >
<target >http:// 127.0.0.1/ habari -0.8/ habari </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >id=comment_name </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >id=comment_name </target >
<value >${RANDOM}</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >id=comment_email </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >id=comment_email </target >
<value >${RANDOM_EMAIL }</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >id=comment_content </target >
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<value >${INJECTION }</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >submit </name >
<target >id=comment -public </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
</commands >
</post >
</root >
A.6 Appendix 6
Use case adopted in Symphony 2.2.5 for testing the filter used against the visitors’ comments.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
<root >
<post >
<commands >
<command >
<name >open </name >
<target >http:// 127.0.0.1/ symphony2 .2.5/ articles/
a-primer -to -symphony -2s-default -theme/#comments </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=fields[author]</target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=fields[author]</target >
<value >${RANDOM}</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=fields[email]</target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=fields[email]</target >
<value >test@test.com </value >
</command >
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<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=fields[website]</target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=fields[website]</target >
<value >${INJECTION }</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=fields[comment]</target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=fields[comment]</target >
<value >${RANDOM}</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >click </name >
<target >name=action[save -comment]</target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >name=fields[website]</target >
<value ></value >
</command >
</commands >
</post >
</root >
A.7 Appendix 7
Use case adopted in Plone 4.4.1 for testing the filter used against the visitors’ comments.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
<root >
<post >
<commands >
<command >
<name >open </name >
<target >http:// localhost :8080/ Test/news/op </target >
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<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >type </name >
<target >id=form -widgets -text </target >
<value >${INJECTION }</value >
</command >
<command >
<name >click </name >
<target >id=form -buttons -comment </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
<command >
<name >click </name >
<target >name=form.button.DeleteComment </target >
<value ></value >
</command >
</commands >
</post >
</root >
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